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The Mechanistic Roots of Occasionalism: Stage One 
What is Occasionalism? 
Occasionalism is the doctrine about causal efficacy that exploits the non-
observational nature of causation.  We observe a prior and a posterior 
state of the universe, and discern the difference between them.  But we 
cannot observe the force or power causally necessitating the change.  
Occasionalists argue: 
     That there is some force causally necessitating such changes; 
     That this force cannot be the in the physical objects themselves. 
     Therefore the causal force must be God. 
God is the only true efficient cause, in other words.  What is interesting is 
the justification of the second premise. 
The Project 
Occasionalism was first developed by Al-Ghazali in eleventh century 
Bagdad.  Al-Ghazali’s position and arguments were universally rejected for 
over 500 years.  Then suddenly in the 1660s, occasionalism reappeared 
among the Cartesian mechanists.  It would flourish among them for almost 
50 years until Newtonianism and Leibnizianism replaced Cartesianism.  We 
are asking three questions: 
     What was it about Cartesian strict mechanism that made precipitated 
this sudden rise in occasionalism’s fortunes? 
     How did this make premise two in the occasionalist argument 
compelling? 
     Why didn’t this emerge in Newtonian and Leibnizian mechanical 
philosophy? 
The Passivity Arg. 
Occasionalists offered a number of 
arguments for premise two.  The first 
we considered was The Passivity 
Argument. 
1. All bodily change is a change in 
motion. 
2. Bodies cannot initiate motion in 
themselves. 
3. Bodies cannot initiate motion in 
others. 
4. Therefore, bodies are completely 
passive. 
5. Nothing passive can be a cause. 
6. Therefore, bodies cannot be 
causes. 
Assessment of PA 
This argument appears to be 
mechanistic by resting on the thesis 
that matter, as mere quantity, is 
inherently passive.  But in fact 
passivity in the sense of being unable 
to initiate motion in other bodies is 
not part of the mechanistic program. 
The passivity argument was a poor 
argument for occasionalism and one 
that betrays no important 
mechanistic roots. 
The No Transfers 
Arg. 
A much better argument is the No 
Transfers Argument.   
1. Motion is a mode of a body. 
2. Modes cannot be transferred to 
other subjects. 
3. Therefore, bodies cannot initiate 
motion by transferring their own 
motion to other bodies. 
4. If bodies are to initiate motion in 
others, they must create that motion 
in those bodies. 
5. This is a creation ex nihilo. 
6. This is clearly absurd. 
7. Therefore, bodies cannot be 
causes. 
Assessment of NT 
This argument gives a proper 
metaphysical basis for attributing 
passivity in the strong sense to bodies.  
And the modal metaphysics was a key 
feature of Cartesian mechanical 
philosophy.  In our judgment, this is a 
key element in the rise of 
occasionalism and explaining why 
occasionalists found premise two 
compelling.  Contrasting the notion of 
property dependence within a modal 
metaphysics and the metaphysics of 
Newtonianism and Leibnizianism will 
be a central task of stage two of our 
project. 
The Quod Nescis 
Arg. 
On the surface this argument looks 
odd and problematic. 
1. Causes must know how to produce 
their effects. 
2. Bodies cannot be knowers. 
3. Therefore bodies cannot be causes. 
4. Finite minds do not know how their 
volitions produce effects in either 
their own bodies or their minds. 
5. Therefore, finite minds cannot be 
causes. 
Assessment of QN 
This argument rests on the 
implausible assumption that causes 
must be agent-like. However, the 
argument might possess a degree of 
plausibility if one pushes the 
mechanistic conception of scientific 
explanation as knowing how to do 
or make something.  Because one 
does not truly understand unless 
one can recreate the natural 
mechanism underlying the causal 
event, and because recreating it is 
simply doing it, one cannot 
understand it unless one is a cause.  
But more is still required for the 
occasionalist to establish the 
converse. 
The No Necessary 
Connection Arg. 
This prominent argument depends 
on the claim that causes must be 
necessarily connected to their 
effects. 
1. Causes must be necessarily 
connected to their effects. 
2. It is always possible to conceive of 
a bodily cause occurring without its 
alleged effect. 
3. Therefore, bodies cannot be 
causes. 
4. It is always possible to conceive of 
a finite mind's volition occurring 
without its alleged effect. 
5. Therefore, finite minds cannot be 
causes. 
6. Therefore, physical objects cannot 
be causes. 
Assessment of NNC 
This is a famous argument because 
of its connection with Humean 
causal skepticism.  But we can find 
little reason for a mechanist to 
endorse its central premise.  Few 
natural philosophers committed to 
the stronger claim that causes must 
be logically necessary for their 
effects; they only committed to 
causes being causally necessary.  
And there is nothing behind the 
mechanical philosophy that seems to 
require anything more than this. 
The Conservation 
as Constant 
Creation Arg. 
Most commentators consider this 
the strongest occasionalist 
argument. 
1. God must conserve physical 
objects in existence. 
2. Conserving something in 
existence is no different from 
constantly recreating it at every 
moment. 
3. Nothing can be created unless it 
is created fully determinate. 
4. Therefore, nothing can be 
created with a power to cause itself 
to come to have some property. 
5. If nothing can be a cause of 
anything in itself, it cannot be a 
cause of anything outside of itself 
either. 
6. Therefore, no finite created thing 
can be a cause. 
Assessment of 
CCC 
We question the usual 
understanding of this argument 
as resting on the premise that 
nothing can be created unless it 
is fully determinate.  A better 
interpretation of this argument 
is that it relies on two 
mechanistic principles.  First, 
that all bodily properties are 
reducible to relations of 
extension.  And second, that 
causes must be simultaneous 
with their effects.  Such a 
reinterpretation of this 
argument makes it more 
plausible to a theorist who 
accepts the necessity of divine 
conservation, and shows the 
argument's mechanistic roots 
much more clearly.   
 
Conclusion 
Of the five arguments occasionalists typically offered for premise two, only NT 
and CCC seem to hold any genuine plausibility.  And these two arguments 
appear to have deep conceptual roots in the new mechanical philosophy of the 
seventeenth century.  NT is importantly dependent on Descartes' conception 
of bodily properties as modes and the notion of existential dependence that is 
bound up with that.  CCC is importantly dependent on the reduction of all 
bodily properties to extension and the premise that causes must be 
simultaneous with their effects.  This study of the occasionalists' arguments 
suggests two preliminary results: (1) that body-body occasionalism, rather than 
body-mind or full blown occasionalism, are the most plausible forms of 
occasionalism and (2) that crucial factors behind explaining why Newtonian 
and Leibnizian physics failed to go in a occasionalist direction was their 
rejection of the metaphysics of modes and their rejection of causal 
simultaneity. Exploring these preliminary results is the purpose of stage two of 
our research program. 
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